University of Tulsa College of Law

TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

2017

Inconsistent Rationales for Capital Punishment
Plus
Russell Christopher

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Inconsistent Rationales for Capital Punishment Plus, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1363 (2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.

CHRISTOPHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/7/2017 10:37 AM

INCONSISTENT RATIONALES FOR
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS
Russell L. Christopher*
While capital punishment is constitutional, death row prisoners
argue that ‘‘capital punishment plus’’------execution plus decades of
post-sentencing, pre-execution incarceration------is unconstitutional. In
denying that capital punishment plus violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, courts employ
three principal rationales. First, lengthy delays between sentencing
and execution are attributable to and the fault of prisoners. Second,
lengthy delays affording thorough appellate and collateral review are
necessary to ensure the accuracy and fairness of death sentences. In
short, accuracy trumps speed. Third, the lengthy review process extending prisoners’ stay on death row is necessary to satisfy the Eighth
Amendment. That is, delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it. This Article argues that these rationales are inconsistent with each other. The first rationale------delay is the prisoner’s
fault------is inconsistent with the second and third rationales------delay is a
consequence of what is constitutionally permissible, desirable, and
obligatory. The first rationale blames prisoners for the very delays
that the other two rationales defend and justify as consequences of
what is affirmatively good. As inconsistent rationales, at least one is
incorrect, and all three are suspect. While not conclusively establishing that capital punishment plus is unconstitutional, this Article
erodes the foundations of its constitutionality.
I.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of the length and nature of the interval between capital sentencing and execution is startling. What was once a brief period of
custodial detention is now a de facto punishment nearly as severe as the
de jure punishment that follows it. Writing about England in the 1700s,
legal historian William Blackstone reported, ‘‘it is enacted by statute that
the judge, before whom a murderer is convicted, shall in passing sentence
direct him to be executed on the next day but one . . . .’’1 While from our
contemporary perspective two days between sentencing and execution is
unfathomably brief, Blackstone nonetheless described it as a torturous,
‘‘short but awful interval’’ for the prisoner.2 The interval must be short,
Blackstone explained, because ‘‘it is of great importance, that the punishment should follow the crime as early as possible’’ in order to further
the penological goals of punishment.3 The typical interval in colonial-era
America was longer: one to several weeks.4 In the modern era, the nationwide average period of delay between sentencing and execution
jumped from two years in 1968,5 to six years in 1984,6 to eight years in
1989,7 to ten years in 1994,8 to twelve years in 1999,9 to fourteen years in
2009,10 to sixteen years in 2011,11 and to ‘‘about eighteen years’’ in 2014.12
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *202 (internal citation omitted) (stating that execution must occur two days after the sentence).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *397 (‘‘[T]he prospect of gratification . . . [from] commit[ting] the crime, should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate these ideas; and
then the execution itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of transgression.’’).
4. E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002).
5. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (noting that the national
median period of death row incarceration in 1968 was 33.3 months).
6. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013---STATISTICAL
TABLES 14 tbl.10 (rev. 2014) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS 2013].
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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In the two leading death penalty states (by number of persons on death
row)------California and Florida13------the current average delay is twenty-five
years.14 These averages, however, do not tell the full story. Recently, the
Supreme Court declined review of a prisoner on death row for thirtynine years.15 Far from being an isolated instance, nearly 200 prisoners nationwide have been on death row for over thirty years.16 Of those, over
fifty have been on death row for about thirty-five years17 and twenty-five
have been on death row for approximately forty years.18 Skeptical the ever escalating ‘‘trend will soon be reversed,’’ Justice Stephen Breyer extrapolates that the average term of death row incarceration will eventually exceed fifty years.19
What was once an execution preceded by a de minimis, but nonetheless ‘‘awful,’’20 period of administrative or custodial detention measured in days or weeks is now ‘‘two separate punishments: lengthy incarceration under very severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in
many states), followed by an execution.’’21 The death penalty has become
the equivalent of (de facto) incarceration in the form of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus (de jure) capital punishment.
With death row prisoners receiving ‘‘decades-plus-death,’’22 these increasingly lengthy periods of death row incarceration have transformed a

12. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Execution List
2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited
May 30, 2017)).
13. DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.15 (California------735, Florida------398). The next
three states with the most death row prisoners are Texas------273, Pennsylvania------190, and Alabama-----190. Id. By the Department of Justice’s latest statistics, these five states ‘‘held 60% of all inmates on
death row on December 31, 2013.’’ Id. at 1.
14. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he State admitted that the last 10
prisoners executed in Florida had spent an average of nearly 25 years on death row before execution.’’
(citing Tr. of Oral Arg. in Hall v. Florida, O.T. 2013, No. 12-10882, pg. 46)); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.
Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that in California delays between sentencing and execution exceed ‘‘25 years on average’’).
15. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The prisoner, Thomas Knight, received his death sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Therefore, he had been incarcerated on death row for thirty-nine years.
16. See DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.15 (citing 192 current death row prisoners
originally placed there from 1974 to 1985).
17. Id. (citing fifty-one current prisoners originally placed on death row from 1980 to 1982).
18. Id. (citing twenty-five current prisoners originally placed on death row from 1974 to 1979).
19. Justice Breyer explains as follows: ‘‘Nearly half of the 3,000 inmates now on death row have
been there for more than 15 years. And, at present execution rates, it would take more than 75 years
to carry out those 3,000 death sentences; thus, the average person on death row would spend an additional 37.5 years there before being executed.’’ Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764---65 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 14 tbl.11, 18 tbl.15) (emphasis added). Adding the fifteen years already spent on death row to Justice Breyer’s speculated additional time of 37.5 years results in a sum of 52.5 years on death row, on average.
20. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *202.
21. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on
(Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211,
230---31 (2012).
22. Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death Row Should Be Deemed Too
Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1124 (2012).
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death sentence from capital punishment per se into capital punishment
plus.
In the wake of this transformation of both the length and nature of
death row incarceration, prisoners began to contest the constitutionality
of capital punishment plus. In what have become known as ‘‘Lackey
claims’’ since 1995 when Clarence Lackey petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, prisoners have advanced two reasons that execution following decades of death row incarceration is disproportionate
punishment violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.23 As Brent Newton, counsel for Lackey and architect of the Lackey claim explained:
[F]irst . . . execution after [incarceration] under the extreme conditions of death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact
more punishment than . . . the Eighth Amendment [allows]; and
second, that neither of the state’s primary interests . . . -----retribution and deterrence------would be meaningfully served . . . after
such a lengthy delay . . . .24
Despite Justice Breyer and former Justice John Paul Stevens repeatedly
endorsing the Lackey claim as meritorious,25 there is no standing court
decision------state or federal------recognizing the claim.26
In repeatedly denying Lackey claims, courts principally invoke the
following three rationales. First, death row prisoners choose to pursue
appellate and collateral review of their sentence.27 As chosen by prisoners, the consequence of that choice------delay between sentence and execu-

23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (‘‘[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’’). Although the
Supreme Court denied Lackey’s petition, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari), the similar claims brought by numerous other death row prisoners
have become known as ‘‘Lackey claims.’’ E.g., Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting
that a claim of excessive delay between sentence and execution violating the Eighth Amendment ‘‘is
commonly known as a ‘Lackey claim’’’); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762 (2002) (‘‘[T]he
claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly known as a ‘Lackey claim’ . . . .’’).
24. Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 41, 54---55 (2012).
25. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 681 (2010) (‘‘Over the past fifteen years, Justices Stevens
and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to address the issue, with Justice Breyer characterizing the claim as ‘serious,’ (quoting Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari)), and ‘particularly strong,’ (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)), and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that prolonged death row incarceration is ‘unacceptably cruel,’ (quoting Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114,
1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)).’’). For Justice Breyer’s most recent dissent
from a denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim, see infra note 36.
26. See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5,
2010) (‘‘[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [Lackey claims] . . . .’’). For decisions ruling capital
punishment unconstitutional based on excessive delay that have been superseded or reversed, see infra
notes 54, 55, 73 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) (emphasizing that the ‘‘petitioner chose to challenge his death sentence’’); McKenzie v.
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 n.21 (9th Cir. 1995) (‘‘[T]o the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in
the hope of obtaining relief, that is a choice they make for themselves.’’).
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tion------is attributable to the prisoners and not the state.28 Second, appellate and collateral review of capital sentences is necessary to ensure their
accuracy and fairness.29 Therefore, the consequence of such review-----delay between sentence and execution------must be constitutionally permissible.30 Third, appellate and collateral review of capital sentences is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.31 Delays caused by satisfying
the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it.32
These three rationales have been extraordinarily influential in dispatching Lackey claims. Nearly every court denying such claims on the
merits have invoked at least one, if not all three.33 Most of the federal circuit courts have endorsed all three.34 The leading opponent of Lackey
claims on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, utilizes at least
two of them.35 Furthermore, these rationales have apparently influenced
the full Court, which has steadfastly declined to review Lackey claims
over the last twenty years.36
Despite the icy reception of Lackey claims in the courts due to the
pervasive influence of these three rationales, three recent developments
suggest signs of a thawing. First, in March 2014, Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the crucial ‘‘swing vote’’ in high profile cases that split an ideologically divided court,37 signaled a potential endorsement of Lackey
28. See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (‘‘The delay
of which he [the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .’’).
29. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (‘‘[T]he cause for the delay . . . [was
that the prisoner] ‘availed himself of procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are carried
out only in appropriate circumstances.’’’ (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466---67)).
30. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008)
(‘‘[D]eath row delays do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay results from the
‘desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that might save
someone’s life.’’’ (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998))).
31. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the state’s ‘‘interest in
insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally mandated safeguards’’).
32. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467 (‘‘We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying
the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.’’); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (‘‘It
would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment
themselves violate it.’’).
33. See, e.g., Jane Marriott, Walking the Eighth Amendment Tightrope: ‘Time Served’ in the United States Supreme Court, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND
IMPLICATIONS 159, 179 (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) (‘‘[There are] three forms of reasoning that inevitably
le[a]d to the [Lackey] claim being rejected. First . . . that courts may find compelling reasons for the
delay. Second . . . delays caused by way of satisfying the demands of the Eighth Amendment simply
cannot violate it. Third . . . the delay was not attributable to the state . . . .’’); infra note 49.
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part II.
36. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting
‘‘the total absence of Supreme Court precedent’’). For the most recent denial of certiorari of a Lackey
claim triggering a response by a Justice, see Correll v. Florida, Nos. 15-6551, 15A424, 2015 WL
6111441, at *1 (Oct. 29, 2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘I remain convinced
that the Court should consider whether nearly 30 years of incarceration under sentence of death is
cruel and unusual punishment.’’).
37. Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the Future of
Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 979---80 (2014) (quoting Charlotte Schneider, Supreme Court
2012-13 Term Highlights, LEGAL INFO. INST. SUP. CT. BULL., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/
supreme_court_2012-2013_term_highlights (last visited May 30, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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claims.38 During oral argument for Hall v. Florida, Justice Kennedy repeatedly asked Florida’s counsel whether average delays of twenty-five
years were ‘‘consistent with the purposes of the death penalty.’’39 Justice
Kennedy ‘‘may be on the brink of joining Justice Breyer and former Justice Stevens’’ in urging the full Court to address Lackey claims.40
Second, in July 2014, a federal court recognized a Lackey claim for
the first time.41 Jones v. Chappell held that execution following nineteen
years on death row violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment for two reasons.42 First, because of systemic inordinate delay, so few death row prisoners will actually be executed
(as opposed to dying of old age or other causes while on death row) as to
make execution unconstitutionally arbitrary.43 Second, delays are sufficiently lengthy ‘‘that the death penalty is deprived of any deterrent or retributive effect it might once have had.’’44 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit reversed Jones on procedural grounds.45
Third, in June of 2015, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed support for Lackey claims for the first time. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross that identified ‘‘unconscionably long
delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose’’46 as one
of three ‘‘fundamental constitutional defects’’47 in the imposition of capital punishment. In addition to undermining capital punishment’s penological justifications, ‘‘lengthy delay in and of itself is especially cruel because it ‘subjects death row inmates to decades of especially severe,
dehumanizing conditions of confinement.’’’48
In light of these recent developments suggesting a renewed appreciation of Lackey claims, this Article critically examines the principal rationales that presently serve to deny Lackey claims. It makes the novel
argument that these three influential rationales are inconsistent with
38. Id. at 980.
39. Id. at 991 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 46---47, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014) (No. 12-10882), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/1210882_7758.pdf.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Newton suggested that Justice Kennedy’s questioning is significant for two reasons: ‘‘First, they did not appear to be off the cuff. In the oral argument
of a case in which certiorari had been granted on a legal issue that had nothing to do with Lackey, Justice Kennedy clearly had prepared for his Lackey-related questions because he cited an arcane statistic
about the average delay before executions in the past ten Florida cases.’’ Id. at 992. ‘‘Second, his repeated question about ‘the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve’ certainly appears to
allude to the primary arguments made by Justices Stevens and Breyer in addressing Lackey claims
since 1995.’’ Id.
40. Id. at 980.
41. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1052---53 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
42. See id. at 1053.
43. See id. at 1062---63.
44. Id. at 1063.
45. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2015) (ruling that the death row prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment claim impermissibly sought application of a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure on collateral review).
46. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2755.
48. Id. at 2765 (quoting Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari)).
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each other. The first rationale------delay is the prisoner’s fault------is inconsistent with the second and third rationales------delay is a consequence of
that which is constitutionally permissible, desirable, and obligatory. In
short, the first rationale blames prisoners for the very delays that the
other two rationales defend and justify as consequences of what is affirmatively good. This inconsistency renders at least one, or as many as
all three, of the rationales incorrect. While not conclusively establishing
the unconstitutionality of capital punishment plus, this inconsistency
does undermine the foundations of its constitutionality.
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part II presents each of
the three principal rationales courts employ to deny Lackey claims in
greater depth. After tracing the origin of each rationale, this Part examines their use by Justice Thomas, federal circuit courts, federal district
courts, and state courts.
Part III argues that the three principal rationales supporting the
constitutionality of capital punishment plus are inconsistent with each
other. The prisoner-fault rationale conflicts with both the accuracy/fairness rationale and the rationale that delays caused by satisfying the
Eighth Amendment cannot violate it. The prisoner-fault rationale seeks
to blame and hold prisoners responsible for what the other two rationales seek to defend and justify as consequences of what is constitutionally
permissible, desirable, and obligatory. Part III next considers the effects
of these rationales’ inconsistency. It explains that either (1) the prisonerfault rationale is wrong, (2) the other two rationales are wrong, or (3) all
three rationales are wrong. Because the rationales’ inconsistency entails
that at least one of the rationales is wrong, but does not inform which
one or ones are wrong, their inconsistency raises doubts as to each rationale. Finally, Part III considers possible resolutions and consequences
of the inconsistency. This Article concludes that consistency bars courts
from invoking all three rationales and their inconsistency erodes the
foundations of the constitutionality of capital punishment plus.
II. PRINCIPAL RATIONALES SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS
This Part presents more expansively each of the three principal rationales employed to deny Lackey claims.49 It identifies the origin of each
49. See Karl S. Myers, Comment, Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding Execution After a
Long Stay on Death Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v. Texas, 106 DICK. L. REV. 647, 661 (2002)
(‘‘[T]here are several fundamental reasons why . . . courts have rejected Lackey claims: first, that the
need for careful review commands the delay; second, that upholding the claim would result in an inconsistency with other Eighth Amendment requirements; and third, because the state did not negligently or intentionally cause the delay.’’); see also Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (‘‘[C]ourts often
rely on two justifications for rejecting the . . . [Lackey claim]: first, . . . delay is reasonably related
to . . . safeguard[ing] the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring the accuracy of . . . [the] death . . .
sentence, and second, . . . delay is caused by the petitioner himself, and therefore cannot be constitutionally problematic.’’); Angela April Sun, Note, ‘‘Killing Time’’ in the Valley of the Shadow of Death:
Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585,
1602---04 (2013) (identifying as the principal arguments against Lackey claims as first, the post-
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rationale, examines their subsequent use, and charts the breadth of their
adoption by Justice Thomas, federal circuit courts, federal district courts,
and state courts.
A.

Prisoner Fault

Perhaps the single most prevalent rationale used to deny Lackey
claims is that delays between sentencing and execution are the prisoners’
own fault.50 Though not always expressly articulated, unpacking the rationale reveals the following steps of argument. Prisoners choose to pursue appellate and collateral review of their capital sentences. A consequence of such review is delay. The consequence of prisoners’ choice-----delay------is therefore the responsibility and fault of the prisoners.51 This
Section traces the history of the prisoner-fault rationale. First, it discusses
the first case to invoke the rationale and surveys all subsequent preconviction review process that causes the delays are necessary for accuracy and ensuring due process
and second, whether the state or prisoner bears responsibility for the delay); Marriot, supra note 33 at
179.
50. See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 22, at 1090 (‘‘For many jurists attribution of fault [between the
prisoner and the state for the delay] is critical to resolving [the Lackey claim].’’). See generally supra
note 49.
51. For authorities rejecting this rationale, see Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[Petitioner] bears little, if any, responsibility for this
delay.’’); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985---86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that delay resulted not from prisoner fault but from two different ‘‘constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings’’); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (noting that much of the twenty-seven year delay stemmed from ‘‘the State’s repeated procedural errors’’); Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (‘‘[M]uch of the delay in California’s postconviction process is created by the State itself, not by inmates’ own interminable efforts to delay.’’);
People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting prisoner-fault
rationale and noting that nearly all Lackey claims are nonfrivolous); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272,
1291 (Mont. 1996) (Leapheart, J., concurring) (rejecting prisoner-fault rationale where prisoner has
been successful in appeals because ‘‘the blame properly rests with the State or the courts’’);
Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCR 348, 353 (‘‘We think that the cause of the delay is
immaterial when the sentence is death. Be the cause for the delay the time necessary for appeal . . . or
some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it would not alter the dehumanizing character of the delay.’’); Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and
Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22 (1998) (‘‘[D]efective
[state] processing systems are the true cause of most of the delay in capital cases.’’); Russell L. Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
3, 34---74 (2015) (contending that the rationale lacks an explicit basis and that neither of its possible
bases------analogizing to attribution of fault in the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right context and waiver of the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment------are persuasive); Michael
Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and Extended Stays on
Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 105---06 (2014) (‘‘[I]t should not matter whether the inmate was
the partial cause of his own delayed execution. The justice system does not allow inmates the right to
starve themselves or to otherwise engage in self-harm. Prisoners should similarly be barred from punishing themselves with additional time on death row.’’); Newton, supra note 24, at 64 (‘‘[T]he delays
occasioned by such discretionary appeals, at least non-frivolous ones, should not be attributed to inmates who pursue such appeals.’’); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s
Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (‘‘[D]elay of execution, regardless of who is responsible and
whether it is intentional or inadvertent . . . giv[es] rise to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.’’); Jeremy Root, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration
of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 299 (2001) (‘‘Frivolous petitions account
for an infinitesimal fraction of the typical period of delay.’’). See generally infra note 61.
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Lackey cases. Second, it presents Justice Thomas’s articulations of the
rationale. Third, it canvasses post-Lackey state and lower federal courts’
adoption of the rationale.
1.

Pre-Lackey Decisions

Perhaps the 1960 case Chessman v. Dickson is the first case to express the prisoner-fault rationale.52 In denying the prisoner’s claim of
cruel and unusual punishment stemming from delay of over eleven years,
the Ninth Circuit court stated, ‘‘I do not see how we can offer life (under
a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the processes for a given number of years, especially when in the end it appears the prisoner
never really had any good points.’’53
The next two cases addressing the issue rejected the prisoner-fault
rationale, finding excessive delay unconstitutional. In 1972, in People v.
Anderson, the California Supreme Court held that ‘‘[a]n appellant’s insistence on receiving the benefits of appellate review of the judgment
condemning him to death does not render the lengthy period of impending execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty from constitutional proscription.’’54 In 1980, in District Attorney for Suffolk District v.
Watson, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled ‘‘that the delay may be due to the defendant’s insistence on exercising his appellate
rights does not mitigate the severity of the impact on the condemned individual, and the right to pursue due process of law must not be set off
against the right to be free from inhuman treatment.’’55
Subsequent cases in the pre-Lackey era all invoked the prisonerfault rationale. In 1986, the court in Richmond v. Ricketts, citing Chessman, explained that the twelve-year delay failed to violate the Eighth
Amendment because it ‘‘was prompted by Richmond’s request . . . to
have his challenges . . . heard by several courts.’’56 Affirming Richmond in
1992, the Ninth Circuit supported its use of the prisoner-fault rationale
52. 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).
53. Id. A subsequent case interprets this proposition as ‘‘distinguish[ing] between innocent delays and delays caused by a defendant’s dilatory tactics.’’ Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir.
1995).
54. 493 P.2d 880, 895 (Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009) (rejecting the state’s argument
‘‘that these delays are acceptable because they often occur at the instance of the condemned prisoner’’).
55. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST.
art. CXVI, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 150 (1984). The court rejected the prisoner-fault rationale offered by the dissent: ‘‘[t]o the extent that a defendant resorts to
those endless appellate procedures, he should not be heard to complain about the prolongation of his
period of anxiety and agony over his possible execution.’’ Id. at 1302. Further explaining the irrelevance of the prisoner’s choice, the court noted, ‘‘[i]t is often the very reluctance of society to impose
the irrevocable sanction of death which mandates, ‘even against the wishes of the criminal, that all
legal avenues be explored before the execution is finally carried out.’’’ Id. at 1283 (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
56. 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986). For a brief discussion of Chessman, see supra notes 52--53 and accompanying text.
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57

by offering Chessman and Andrews v. Shulsen as ‘‘relevant, though not
controlling, precedents.’’58 The court explained that the Andrews ‘‘court
reasoned that to accept the petitioner’s argument would be ‘a mockery of
justice’ given that the delay was attributable more to petitioner’s actions
[of challenging his death sentence] than to the state’s.’’59 In 1995, just prior to Lackey, the Seventh Circuit in Free v. Peters found that ‘‘any inordinate delay in the execution of Free’s sentence is directly attributable to
his own conduct.’’60
2.

Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas emphasized prisoners’ choice of and fault for execution delays in all four of his concurrences to the denial of certiorari of
Lackey claims.61 In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas characterized the
prisoner as ‘‘avail[ing] himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral
procedures and then complain[ing] when his execution is delayed.’’62 In
Foster v. Florida, Justice Thomas commented that the ‘‘[p]etitioner could
long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting to
what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.’’63 In
Thompson v. McNeil, Justice Thomas emphasized that the ‘‘petitioner
chose to challenge his death sentence’’64 and quoted from a Fourth Cir57. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984).
58. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. (quoting Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431). The prisoner in Andrews was not making a Lackey claim, but instead argued that the repeated setting and staying of execution dates violated the
Eighth Amendment. Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431. Andrews reasoned that ‘‘[t]he extensive and repeated review of petitioner’s death sentence was sought by petitioner and is afforded by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments and by federal law. To accept petitioner’s argument would create an
irreconcilable conflict between constitutional guarantees and would be a mockery of justice.’’ Id.
60. 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995).
61. Apart from Justice Thomas, the only other current member of the Supreme Court that has
addressed the rationale is Justice Stephen Breyer. Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer is clearly not
a proponent of the rationale. But also unlike Justice Thomas, his precise view is not entirely clear. In
individual cases he maintains that delay was the fault of the state and not the prisoner. E.g., Thompson
v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1120 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[The thirtytwo year] delay here resulted in significant part from constitutionally defective death penalty procedures for which petitioner was not responsible.’’); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (referring to ‘‘astonishingly long delays flowing in significant
part from constitutionally defective death penalty procedures’’); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[The prisoner] has experienced that [twentythree year] delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous appeals on
his own part.’’); supra note 51. But Justice Breyer never clearly rejects the prisoner-fault rationale as
irrelevant in principle. The closest he comes to doing so is as follows: ‘‘one cannot realistically expect a
defendant condemned to death to refrain from fighting for his life by seeking to use whatever procedures the law allows.’’ Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
Justice Breyer’s most recent statement possibly concerning the rationale, though not specifically referring to it, suggests that at least some causes of delay may be irrelevant: ‘‘though these legal causes [adherence to constitutional procedural requirements] may help to explain, they do not mitigate the
harms caused by delay itself.’’ Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62. 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999).
63. 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting id. at 993)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
64. 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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cuit concurring opinion: ‘‘It makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . .
for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of
delay . . . has secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence,
to then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’’’65 Finally, in Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Thomas reiterated the above statement from Knight.66
3.

Post-Lackey Decisions

The most influential American case deciding a Lackey claim is perhaps McKenzie v. Day.67 Rejecting the prisoner’s claim that execution
following a twenty-year delay violates the Eighth Amendment, McKenzie stated that ‘‘[t]he delay has been caused by the fact that McKenzie
has availed himself of [opportunities to challenge his sentence].’’68
McKenzie stressed that delay is the choice of the prisoner:
A number of death row inmates have refused to avail themselves of
avenues of review precisely to avoid this ordeal [of decades on
death row]. This option is available to anyone sentenced to die, and
to the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in the hope of
obtaining relief, that is a choice they make for themselves.69
Numerous other federal circuit court cases have denied Lackey claims by
relying on the prisoner-fault rationale.70 Federal district court cases71 and
state cases72 have similarly rejected Lackey claims on this basis. The only
65. Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).
66. See 558 U.S. 1067, 1071 (2009).
67. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).
68. Id. at 1466---67.
69. Id. at 1470 n.21 (citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 957 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing the prisoner’s claim from other cases where ‘‘much of the delay had been due to the State’s own errors’’); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (‘‘Delay has come about because Chambers, of
course with justification, has contested the judgments against him, and, on two occasions, has done so
successfully.’’); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (‘‘White has had the choice of seeking further review . . . or avoiding further delay of his execution by not petitioning for further review . . . .’’); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (‘‘[B]ecause Appellant chose to
avail himself of stays to pursue these avenues of review, they may not be used to support an Eighth
Amendment claim.’’); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (‘‘The
delay of which he [the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .’’); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995) (‘‘Fearance was not the unwilling victim of
a Bleak House---like procedural system hopelessly bogged down; at every turn, he . . . sought extensions
of time, hearings and reconsiderations.’’); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995)
(‘‘We note that Porter has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have been attributable to negligence or deliberate action of the state.’’).
71. See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5,
2010) (‘‘[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the prisoner’s claim] . . . especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.’’); Hairston v. Paskett, No. CV---00---303---S---BLW, 2008 WL
3874614, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 15, 2008) (‘‘[P]rolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does
not offend the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the delay results from the prisoners unsuccessful
pursuit of collateral relief and not from the State’s dilatory tactics.’’); Delvecchio v. Illinois, No. 95 C
6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (‘‘Petitioner has extended the time . . . of his execution and therefore, any additional punishment caused by the delay is attributable to the petitioner.’’).
72. See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (‘‘[D]efendant’s claim that the
state is solely responsible for the delays in this case is inaccurate.’’); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017
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post-Lackey decision recognizing a Lackey claim, Jones v. Chappell, rejected the prisoner-fault rationale not on principle but on empirical
grounds: ‘‘much of the delay in California’s post conviction process is
created by the State itself, not by inmates’ own interminable efforts to
delay.’’73
B.

Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness

Many courts reject Lackey claims on the ground that a lengthy postconviction review process is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair verdict or sentence so that no innocent is convicted and punished. Unpacking the rationale reveals the following steps of argument. Because accuracy and fairness are constitutionally valuable, any consequence of that
pursuit of accuracy and fairness must be constitutionally acceptable. Delay between sentencing and execution is such a consequence. Therefore,
such delay must be constitutionally acceptable. In short, accuracy trumps
speed.74
(Cal. 1992) (‘‘Defendant, however, does not------and in good faith cannot------allege even the slightest undue delay by the state in this case.’’); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011) (‘‘Valle ‘cannot now
contend that his punishment has been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his sentence is in large part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction[s] and sentence.’’’ (quoting
Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008))); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151 (Idaho
1999) (‘‘Death row prisoners are not entitled to have their sentences commuted to life because of the
delay caused by their own unsuccessful collateral attacks on their sentences.’’); Bieghler v. State, 839
N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (‘‘[T]he time between his conviction and the approaching execution flows
from his having availed himself of the appeals process.’’); State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 492 (La. 2011)
(‘‘Much of the delay in the direct appeal is clearly attributable to the defendant . . . . Thus his argument
contending the length of time on death row violates the Eighth Amendment rings hollow.’’); Jordan v.
State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001) (‘‘[T]he Constitution would not protect a defendant who
availed himself of the ‘panoply of appellate and collateral procedures’ and then claimed that his execution had been too long delayed.’’ (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari))); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (noting that defendant ‘‘has availed himself [of the review process] . . . which has resulted in the delay and the multiple sentencing hearings in this case’’); Moore v. State, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (‘‘The delay in
carrying out the sentence of death has been caused by the fact that Moore has availed himself of [the
review process].’’); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 486 (Tenn. 2002) (‘‘As in most cases, the delay in
the instant case was caused in large part by numerous appeals and collateral attacks lodged by the Appellant.’’).
73. 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
74. For authorities criticizing this rationale, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (‘‘The right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment [prolonged death row
incarceration] cannot, of course, be played off against the right to pursue due process of law.’’); Jones
v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting that a prisoner must choose between
speed and accuracy); Dist. Att’y Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (‘‘[T]he
right to pursue due process of law must not be set off against the right to be free from inhuman treatment.’’); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (‘‘I see no simple
answer to the conundrum which results from the conflict between a defendant’s right to due process
and appellate review and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.’’); DAVID PANNICK,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY 84 (1982) (‘‘[A] death sentence becomes unconstitutionally cruel unless carried out within a reasonable time . . . and without the incidental infringement of any
of the other rights (such as the right to appeal against conviction and sentence) guaranteed by due
process.’’); Newton, supra note 24, at 64 (‘‘[I]t is axiomatic in our legal system that a person should not
have to waive one constitutional right in order to exercise another.’’); Rapaport, supra note 22, at
1126---27 (‘‘[T]he proper way to frame the Eighth Amendment issue is not as a choice between dispatch
and delay.’’); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged
Death Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 218 (1999) (‘‘Re-
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Perhaps the first decision invoking this rationale is Richmond v.
Ricketts in 1986.75 Richmond rejected a twelve-year delay as constituting
cruel and unusual punishment because ‘‘it is better to take the time to
consider each issue [presented by the prisoner] thoroughly rather than
quickly dispatching someone to the gas chamber.’’76 Affirming the district
court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit found relevant a case relied upon by
the lower court------Harrison v. United States.77 In Harrison, the Supreme
Court ‘‘held that an eight-year delay between an arrest and sentencing
was not unconstitutional where the delay resulted from the need to assure careful review of an unusually complex case.’’78 The Ninth Circuit
returned to this theme of error prevention justifying delays in McKenzie
v. Day.79 McKenzie stated that ‘‘[t]he delay has been caused by the . . .
procedures our law provides to make sure that executions are carried out
only in appropriate circumstances.’’80 According to McKenzie, ‘‘most of
these procedural safeguards have been imposed by the Supreme Court in
recognition of the fact that the common law practice of imposing swift
and certain executions could result in arbitrariness and error in carrying
out the death penalty.’’81 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit rejected a Lackey
claim based on a seventeen-year delay because the prisoner’s ‘‘claim demands that capital punishment be carried out quickly in spite of the importance of thorough fact-finding in capital cases and the state’s compelling interest in ensuring that it does not execute innocent defendants.’’82
In Chambers v. Bowersox, the Eighth Circuit contended, ‘‘delay, in large
part, is a function of the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it
right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that
might save someone’s life.’’83 Denying that a thirty-one year stay on death
row violated the Eighth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit quoted approvingly the above language from Chambers.84

quiring a prisoner to forgo either the right to appeal his sentence or an Eighth Amendment claim [unconstitutionally] forces the prisoner to choose the protection of one constitutional guarantee over another.’’); Root, supra note 51, at 326 (‘‘To suggest that a citizen loses the protection of the Eighth
Amendment because he chooses to pursue appellate review of his capital sentence seems highly improper.’’).
75. 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986).
76. Id.
77. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (1992) (citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S.
219, 221 n.4 (1968)).
78. Id.
79. 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. Id. at 1466---67.
81. Id. at 1467.
82. White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); accord. id. at 440 (‘‘On the merits, these
claims would likewise fail because the delay that White complains of arises from post-conviction proceedings which exist to protect White and which White, himself, requested when he petitioned for habeas relief.’’).
83. 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998).
84. Thompson v. Sec’y Dep’t. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (‘‘[D]eath row delays
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay results from the ‘desire of our courts,
state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that might save someone’s life.’’’ (quoting
Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570)).

CHRISTOPHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1376

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

8/7/2017 10:37 AM

[Vol. 2017

State courts rejecting Lackey claims also invoke this rationale. Both
the Supreme Courts of Montana and Nebraska approvingly quoted
McKenzie’s above language.85 The Supreme Court of Illinois approvingly
quoted the above language from Chambers.86 The Indiana Supreme
Court rejected a Lackey claim, reasoning that ‘‘[t]o ensure the just administration of the death penalty the value of speed should not trump accuracy.’’87 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that
‘‘[t]he value of speed should not trump the value of accuracy.’’88
C.

Post-Conviction Review Necessary to Satisfy Eighth Amendment

The last of the principal rationales employed to deny Lackey claims
is that delays that are a consequence of adherence to the Eighth
Amendment or other constitutional mandates cannot be unconstitutional. Unpacking the rationale reveals the following steps of argument. The
various levels of appellate and collateral review are constitutionally necessary, and a consequence of that which is constitutionally necessary
must also be constitutional. The consequence of post-conviction review is
delay between sentence and execution. Therefore, such delay is constitutional. In short, delay caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it.89
Two federal circuit court opinions have advanced the most influential versions of this rationale.90 In White v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit denied a Lackey claim involving seventeen years on death row because
‘‘there are compelling justifications for the delay between conviction and
85. State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466---67);
State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466---67).
86. People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000) (quoting Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570).
87. Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ind. 2002).
88. State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011).
89. For criticisms of this rationale, see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (‘‘A death penalty system that is unreliable or procedurally unfair
would violate the Eighth Amendment. And so would a system that, if reliable and fair in its application of the death penalty, would serve no penological purpose [because of excessive delay].’’) (citation
omitted)); Russell L. Christopher, Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 843, 896---98 (2016) (the third rationale erroneously conflates what is necessary to satisfy the
Eighth Amendment with what is sufficient); cf. Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 648, 650---51 (2000)
(‘‘The court [denying the Lackey claim] failed to acknowledge the possibility that extensive post-trial
procedures could be both necessary and cruel------necessary because they satisfy a constitutional mandate, and cruel because they generate delays prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.’’).
90. It is not entirely clear whether Justice Thomas articulates this rationale. He at least comes
quite close in his following statement: ‘‘[c]onsistency would seem to demand that those who accept our
death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution
as a necessary consequence.’’ Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (concurring in denial of certiorari). And Justice Thomas quotes this statement approvingly in two of his other concurrences to the
denial of certiorari of Lackey claims. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (quoting
Knight, 528 U.S. at 992); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 992).
If Justice Thomas’ phrase ‘‘death penalty jurisprudence,’’ Knight, 528 U.S. at 992, may be understood
as the constitutional requirements for the imposition of the death penalty prescribed by the Supreme
Court, then Justice Thomas seems to be arguing that delay is a necessary consequence of satisfying
capital punishment’s constitutional requirements. Interpreted in this way, Justice Thomas might well
be arguing that because delay is necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements, delay must be constitutionally acceptable.
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the execution of a death sentence. The state . . . [has an] interest in insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally
mandated safeguards.’’91 Decisions from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have approvingly quoted White’s argument that such delays stem from
compliance with ‘‘constitutionally mandated safeguards.’’92 In McKenzie
v. Day, the Ninth Circuit found the prisoner’s twenty-year delay ‘‘a consequence of our evolving standards of decency, which prompt us to provide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest their convictions and sentences.’’93 Because evolving standards of decency is a
measure of the constitutionality of capital punishment under the Eighth
Amendment,94 McKenzie is, in effect, declaring that delay is a product of
satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In rejecting the prisoner’s claim of
cruel and unusual punishment, the court stated, ‘‘[w]e cannot conclude
that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.’’95
State courts have also invoked the rationale. Citing McKenzie and
White, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that ‘‘the very nature of
capital litigation . . . suggests that delay . . . is the product of evolving
standards of decency.’’96 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals maintained that ‘‘[t]he existence of delays in appellant’s case have arguably
been necessary to ensure that his conviction and sentence are proper and
not inhumane.’’97 The court explained that the Constitution ‘‘does not
and cannot protect [death row prisoners] against those costs which are
necessary and inherent in the exercise of the rights it guarantees.’’98
Echoing McKenzie, the court is essentially stating that delays due to procedures necessary to satisfy the Constitution cannot violate the Constitution. The California Supreme Court, in a decision predating McKenzie,
held that ‘‘[t]he existence of an automatic appeal under state law [that
caused significant delay and prolonged the prisoner’s stay on death row]
is not a constitutional defect; it is a constitutional safeguard.’’99 That is,
delays caused by constitutional safeguards cannot be constitutional defects. In People v. Ochoa, the California Supreme Court reasoned that
‘‘the time required for our statutorily mandated review is not a violation
of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights; it is essential to ensuring

91. 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996).
92. Thompson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting White, 79
F.3d at 439); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439).
93. 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring that punishment which does not satisfy
‘‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’’ may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).
95. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
96. Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998).
97. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
98. Id. (citing Louisiana ex rel. v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding only unnecessary
suffering in the execution of a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment)).
99. People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
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that those rights are and have been respected.’’100 Again, the underlying
principle is that delays essential to satisfying prisoners’ rights cannot violate prisoners’ rights. Finding White persuasive and adopting McKenzie’s
language, another California Supreme Court decision declared that ‘‘the
delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it.’’101
The Supreme Court of Nebraska advanced an even more forceful formulation of McKenzie’s language: ‘‘[i]t would be a mockery of justice to
conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.’’102
III. INCONSISTENCY OF THE RATIONALES
This Part argues that the three rationales are inconsistent with each
other. The first rationale blames and holds prisoners responsible for the
consequences of what the second rationale acknowledges is necessary to
ensure accurate and fair sentences and what the third rationale concedes
is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment and the Constitution. The
first rationale blames and holds prisoners responsible for what the second and third rationales defend as consequences of what is constitutionally permissible, desirable, and obligatory. In short, the first rationale
seeks to blame prisoners for the very delays that the second and third rationales seek to justify as consequences of what is affirmatively good. After establishing the rationales’ inconsistency, this Part considers various
resolutions and consequences of the inconsistency. Part III concludes
that, as a result of the rationales’ inconsistency, at least one of the rationales is incorrect, and all three are suspect.
A.

The Prisoner-Fault and Accuracy/Fairness Rationales Conflict

This Section argues that the accuracy/fairness rationale is inconsistent with the prisoner-fault rationale. The prisoner-fault rationale
blames and holds prisoners responsible for the delays;103 the accuracy/fairness rationale defends and justifies the delays as consequences of
ensuring accurate and fair death sentences and ensuring no innocent is
executed.104 The prisoner-fault rationale blames and holds prisoners responsible for the very delays that facilitate and promote what the accuracy/fairness rationale defends as ‘‘the state’s compelling interest’’ in and
‘‘the desire of our courts’’ for accurate and fair sentences.105 It is inconsistent to hold against prisoners the very same actions deemed constitutionally permissible and desirable.
100. 28 P.3d 78, 115---16 (Cal. 2001) (quoting People v. Ochoa, 996 P.2d 442, 446 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
101. People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal. 1998) (citing McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467
(9th Cir. 1995)).
102. State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).
103. See supra Section II.A.
104. See supra Section II.B.
105. See supra notes 82---84 and accompanying text.
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To further illustrate the inconsistency of the rationales, consider the
accuracy-trumps-speed articulation of the accuracy/fairness rationale.106
The prisoner-fault rationale blames prisoners for the very delays that facilitate and promote accuracy over speed. Prisoners causing delays
through appellate and collateral review of their sentences promote (rather than undermine) accuracy over speed. If accuracy is preferred over
speed, then there is no reason to blame prisoners for delays that promote
accuracy. The two rationales are inconsistent with each other. The prisoner-fault rationale is instead consistent with the converse of the accuracy/fairness rationale------a speed trumps accuracy rationale. If speed
trumps accuracy, then it would be consistent to blame prisoners for delays that undermine speed prevailing over accuracy. But since the accuracy/fairness rationale claims that accuracy trumps speed, blaming prisoners for seeking accuracy at speed’s expense is inconsistent. As a result,
the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with the accuracy/fairness rationale.
B.

Prisoner-Fault and Eighth-Amendment Rationales Conflict

This Section argues that the Eighth-Amendment rationale------delays
caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it------is inconsistent with the prisoner-fault rationale. The two rationales conflict in
two ways: the cause for the delays and the blame for the delays. First, the
prisoner-fault rationale identifies prisoners as the cause of the delays;107
the Eighth-Amendment rationale identifies satisfaction of the Eighth
Amendment as the cause of the delays.108 If satisfying the EighthAmendment is the cause of the delays (as the Eighth-Amendment rationale maintains), then prisoners are not the cause of the delays (contrary to what the prisoner-fault rationale maintains). If prisoners, however,
are the cause of the delays (as the prisoner-fault rationale maintains),
then satisfying the Eighth Amendment is not the cause of the delays
(contrary to what the Eighth-Amendment rationale maintains). By attributing the cause of the delays to different sources------death row prisoners and satisfaction of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner-fault and
Eighth-Amendment rationales are inconsistent with each other.109
106. See supra notes 76, 87---88 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Section II.A.
108. See supra Section II.C.
109. One might argue that both are not ‘‘the cause,’’ but both are ‘‘a cause’’ of the delays. As Justice John Paul Stevens commented, ‘‘delays have multiple causes.’’ Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S.
1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Of course, when there is a plurality of
causes there is a diminution of responsibility for any one cause or party. That is, if prisoners are a
cause but not the sole cause of delays they should bear not full but at most partial responsibility. And
there are many possible causes of the delays. First, the State may be a cause by holding constitutionally defective trials and sentencing hearings. See, e.g., Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[M]uch of the delay at issue seems due to constitutionally
defective sentencing proceedings.’’); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (characterizing delays as stemming primarily from states’ ‘‘constitutionally
defective death penalty procedures’’). Second, States may fail to provide sufficient resources of court
time and counsel for indigents to prevent delays. See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053
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Second, if the delays are caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment, and are thus constitutional as the Eighth-Amendment rationale
maintains,110 then there is no legitimate reason to blame and fault prisoners for the delays. It is inconsistent to blame and hold prisoners responsible for the consequences of what is constitutionally obligatory. Moreover, why blame and fault prisoners for what is constitutionally obligatory
for the State? It is the State, not a prisoner or defendant, that has constitutional duties in criminal matters.111 The State, not the prisoner, has the
ultimate constitutional responsibility for both the nature and manner of
imposition of punishment.112 No matter what a prisoner chooses, causes,
or intends, the State has the ultimate constitutional responsibility of not
imposing cruel and unusual punishment.113 Therefore, it is inconsistent to
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (‘‘[T]he dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty system has resulted, and will continue to result, in an inordinate and unpredictable period of delay preceding . . . execution[s].’’); id. at 1056---57 (noting ‘‘the State’s underfunding of its death penalty system to be a key
source of the problem’’). Third, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts may be yet another cause.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[T]his Court and the lower federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of the death penalty . . . into arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described
in Charles Dickens’ ‘Bleak House.’’’); id. (‘‘I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some
responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice system.’’). For statements by Justice Thomas and
former Justice Antonin Scalia that the Supreme Court is the sole cause of the delays, see infra text
accompanying notes 116---18.
110. See supra Section II.C.
111. The State may be responsible for the consequences of defendants’ choices even in the arguable absence of any State action. For example, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court considered
whether ineffectiveness of privately retained (not State-appointed) counsel constituted a Sixth
Amendment violation of the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel. See 446 U.S. 335, 343
(1980). Clearly, any ineffectiveness of counsel stemmed from the defendant’s choices and not the
State. The defendant both chose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel and the defendant
chose (selected) his counsel. If the consequence of those choices by the defendant was the ineffectiveness of counsel, how could the State be responsible when the State did nothing to contribute to the
ineffectiveness of counsel? The State advanced this very argument: ineffectiveness of ‘‘retained counsel does not involve State action’’ and thus cannot be the basis for a constitutional violation. Id. at 342.
Rejecting the State’s argument, see id. at 344, the Court explained that ‘‘a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Id. at 343 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236---37 (1941); Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90---91 (1923)). Cuyler further explained that ‘‘[w]hen a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial [a trial in which the defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel],
it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.’’ Id. at 343. Therefore, regardless of defendants’ choices, it is the State that has the ultimate constitutional duty and responsibility to provide defendants with a fair trial. See id. at 344 (‘‘[T]he State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself
implicates the State in the defendant’s conviction . . . .’’).
112. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (‘‘[T]he Eighth Amendment reaffirms
the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.’’); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428 (1980) (‘‘[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to
tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.’’); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (‘‘The State, even as it
punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings.’’); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (‘‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure
that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.’’); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005) (‘‘The purpose of the
Eighth Amendment ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ however, is to place constraints on the
ways in which we pursue [the penological purposes of punishment].’’).
113. For example, suppose a death row prisoner intentionally becomes insane (by consuming illegal drugs, ingesting toxic substances, or sustaining a head injury) for the purpose of delaying or per-
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blame and hold prisoners responsible for consequences of what is constitutionally obligatory for the State. As a result of either of these two bases
of conflict or inconsistency, the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent
with the Eighth-Amendment rationale.
C.

Resolutions and Consequences of the Inconsistency

As argued in the two previous Sections, the three principal rationales courts invoke to deny Lackey claims are inconsistent with each other. The prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with both the accuracy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales. Due to their
inconsistency with each other, at least one of the rationales is incorrect. If
the prisoner-fault rationale is correct, then both the accuracy/fairness and
Eighth-Amendment rationales are incorrect. If the latter rationales are
correct, however, then the prisoner-fault rationale is incorrect. The rationales’ inconsistency means either (1) the prisoner-fault rationale is incorrect, (2) both the accuracy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales
are incorrect, or (3) all three rationales are incorrect. Merely that they
are inconsistent, however, cannot determine which of the three rationales are incorrect.
One obvious solution to the inconsistency is to simply eliminate the
incorrect rationale(s), thereby expunging the inconsistency. But is there a
basis for determining which of the three inconsistent rationales are incorrect? Courts and commentators have criticized all three.114
Moreover, each of the three is inconsistent, not only with each other, but also with other arguments offered by those denying Lackey
claims. Both the accuracy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales
conflict with the following remedy offered by Justice Thomas to a Lackey
claimant objecting to twenty-seven years on death row: ‘‘[p]etitioner
could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting
to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.’’115
Inviting death row prisoners to submit to execution, thereby foregoing a
lengthy review process, is inconsistent with both the accuracy/fairness
manently preventing execution. The prisoner chose to commit a capital crime with the possible consequence of capital punishment. The prisoner also chose to harm herself with the possible consequence
of insanity. The prisoner chose, is the sole cause of, and is at fault for everything------the commission of
the crime, the punishment, and the insanity. Surely the State can constitutionally execute the prisoner? It cannot. As the Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright held, ‘‘the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
state from carrying out a sentence of death upon a person who is insane.’’ 477 U.S. 399, 409---10 (1986).
Executing an insane person constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. Ford announced a categorical bar against executing the insane. See, e.g., Jonathan Greenberg, Note, For Every Action There
is a Reaction: The Procedural Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229
(2012) (‘‘Ford . . . establish[ed] a categorical exclusion shielding [insane] defendants from capital punishment . . . .’’). That a person is insane is sufficient to trigger the bar, how the person became insane is
irrelevant. That the insanity was a consequence (even intended) of the prisoner’s choices does not preclude imposition of capital punishment on this prisoner from being unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.
114. See sources cited supra notes 51, 74, and 89.
115. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(quoting id. at 993) (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
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and Eighth-Amendment rationales that defend and justify the lengthy
review process as necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfaction of the
Eighth Amendment.
The prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with arguments made by
both Justice Thomas and former Justice Antonin Scalia that blame the
Supreme Court for the excessive delays. While the prisoner-fault rationale blames prisoners for the delays, Justice Thomas argued in Knight
v. Florida that ‘‘in most cases raising [a Lackey claim,] the delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death
penalty jurisprudence.’’116 In dismissing Justice Breyer’s claim that capital
punishment is unconstitutional due, in part, to excessive delay, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, contended that the Supreme Court is
the sole cause of the delays:
Of course, this delay is a problem of the Court’s own making. As
Justice Breyer concedes, for more than 160 years, capital sentences
were carried out in an average of two years or less. But by 2014, he
tells us, it took an average of eighteen years to carry out a death
sentence. What happened in the intervening years? Nothing other
than the proliferation of labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment, promulgated by this Court.117
Justices Scalia and Thomas are clearly stating that not only are delays a
problem caused by the Court, but also that nothing other than the
Court’s ‘‘Byzantine’’ and ‘‘labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment’’ are the cause of the delays.118 That would seem to exclude prisoner
fault as a basis for the delays and contradict the prisoner-fault rationale.
As a result, the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with arguments of
Justices Thomas and Scalia.
Without an obvious resolution, the inconsistency of the three rationales has two effects------one direct and another that is indirect and subtler. First, either the prisoner-fault rationale or the other two rationales
are incorrect. In denying Lackey claims, courts cannot consistently assert
all three. Consistency bars their joint assertion. Consistency requires
courts to choose either the prisoner-fault rationale or the other two rationales. The second effect, comparatively indirect and subtle, is that the
joint inconsistency of the three rationales raises doubts about each individually. While consistency permits assertion of either the prisoner-fault
rationale or the other two rationales (but not all three), the very indeterminacy of which rationale is incorrect (and the possibility that all
three might be incorrect) renders each individual rationale suspect.

116. 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
117. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
118. See supra notes 116---17 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of execution plus decades of death row incarceration------capital punishment plus------rests principally on three rationales.
These three rationales, however, are inconsistent with each other. While
establishing their inconsistency does not determine which of the rationales are incorrect, it does establish that at least one of them is incorrect.
Therefore, consistency bars courts from invoking all three rationales.
While only jointly inconsistent, the very indeterminacy as to which rationale is incorrect renders each individual rationale suspect. Although
not conclusively establishing the unconstitutionality of capital punishment plus, the inconsistency of the three principal rationales erodes the
foundations of the constitutionality of capital punishment plus.
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